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INTRODUCTION

Who would not like to make a 700% return on an investment
in a relatively short period of time? Although this offer is obviously
too good to be true, over the last sixty years countless people have
fallen victim to this allure. In fact, fraudulent pyramid investment
schemes recur regularly.' To address this problem, New Jersey's
Legislature considered a bill which would have prohibited pyramid
scams, ' but ultimately declined to enact any new legislation.
Although the state may bring civil actions against a promoter
under the Consumer Fraud Act- and the Uniform Securities Law4
and criminally prosecute under the theft statute5 and the Uniform
Securities Law, case law, including the appellate division decision
State of New Jersey v. FredericaBey6 and the NewJersey Supreme Court
decision State v. DeLuzio,7 raises the question of whether New
Jersey, like Delaware and Michigan,' should adopt legislation
prohibiting pyramid promotion scams.
The defendant, in Bey, was acquitted of theft by deception.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
overturned the defendant's conviction for promoting an illegal lottery after concluding that pyramid schemes do not fall within the
statute which prohibits illegal lotteries.9 This decision, however, is
more significant for the fact that it reveals a conflict in two lines of
* Assistant Monmouth County Prosecutor, Guest Instructor U.S. Department of
the Treasury Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
I See Heine, Point of No Return, ASBURY PARK PRESS, April 2, 1993, at 1.
2 See Appendix A (An Act prohibiting pyramid promotional schemes and supplementing Chapter 20 of Title 2C of the NewJersey Statutes S. 166, 1994 Sess. (1994)).
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -80 (West 1995).
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:3-47 to -76.
5 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-1 to -37.
6 261 NJ. Super. 182, 618 A.2d 373 (App. Div. 1992).
7 136 N.J. 363, 618 A.2d 373 (1994).
8 See6 DF-L. LAws § 2561(1) (1995); MIcH. CoMp. LAws § 445.1528 (West 1989).
9 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-1 (h).
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cases: one construing pyramid investments as merchandise under
the Consumer Fraud Act and the other holding pyramid investments as securities under the Uniform Securities Law. This article
analyzes the potential adverse ramifications arising from this
conflict.
WHAT IS A PYRAMID?

What is a pyramid scheme? Is it unlawful? If it is, what law
applies and what are the consequences? Unfortunately, neither
civil nor criminal law provides easy answers to these questions.
A pyramid scheme is similar to a chain letter. It is "inherently
deceptive for the seemingly endless chain must come to a halt inasmuch as growth cannot be perpetual and the market becomes saturated by the number of participants ....

[M] any participants are

mathematically barred from ever recouping their original investments, let alone making profits."1" The traditional pyramid
scheme, now known as "the Network," among other names, has
predictably reemerged. The Network consists of a basic four-level
pyramid. One person occupies the top position of the pyramid,
often referred to as the Chairman, and two people occupy the second level of the pyramid and are referred to as Presidents. Four
people occupy the third level of the pyramid and are referred to as
Executive Vice-Presidents, and eight people occupy the bottom
level of the pyramid and are referred to as Vice-Presidents. For an
initial payment of $1,500, one buys into the bottom level of the
pyramid. When all eight of the bottom level positions are filled,
$12,000.00 has been acquired by the pyramid. This $12,000 is obtained by the Chairman, who theoretically leaves the pyramid. The
pyramid now splits in two with each of the participants moving up
one level. Thus, the two Presidents now become a Chairman in
separate pyramids; the Executive Vice-Presidents now become Presidents, and the Vice-Presidents become Executive Vice-Presidents.
It is also the obligation of the initial investors to refill the lowest
level of the pyramid by bringing in eight new investors per pyramid, each supplying an additional $1,500 investment.
Calculations prepared by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities
reveal that for a person to advance from the bottom level to the
12
Chairman position, 127 people must participate in this scheme.
10 Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 232, 293 A.2d 682,
691 (Ch. Div. 1972).
11 See Appendix B.

12 See Appendix C.
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At about the twenty-first level of the pyramid, an entering participant would cash out at the twenty-fifth level, requiring participation of over 268,000,000 people. This is more than the population
of the United States.
In a typical pyramid scheme the organizers or promoters usually advise potential investors that the pyramid is legal. Moreover,
they often disavow the label "pyramid" and claim that they are marketing an investment network. Participants are required to invest
in cash only and use nicknames or pseudonyms concealing their
identity. Promoters often use group motivation as an incentive to
invest, fostering an atmosphere similar to revival meetings. They
also publish pamphlets encouraging investors by outlining the
great returns and low risk.
The Bureau of Securities' calculations reveal, however, that
pyramid schemes result in the loss of investment for most participants, although early investors may make the promised $12,000
payoff at the Chairman level. This early payout provides an opportunity for the organizers themselves to reinvest profits initially
made, thereby reaping multiple payouts in the scheme. Indeed,
that pseudonyms or nicknames are often used makes it easier for
the organizer to conceal his identity, occupy all of the upper levels
of the pyramid, and be the sole recipient of all money invested.
The scheme will ultimately fail given the large number of participants needed to keep the pyramid going. Even the investor entering at level one must rely on 126 other individuals to invest.
Most investors, however, fail to realize the need for such a great
number of participants. The scheme also has other inherent pitfalls. Participants tend to recruit people they know and therefore
cause an undue concentration of recruiters trying to attract others
in the immediate vicinity. Thus, the pool of potential investors is
often much smaller than participants initially realize. Moreover,
participants are never told on which level they are entering the
pyramid and are therefore unaware of how many participants have
already invested before them and that the scheme is on the verge
of collapse. Thus, the organizers prevent potential investors from
acquiring information, namely the size of the participant pool,
which would affect their judgment. This is the core deception of
the scheme. Pyramid sales are also sometimes used to promote a
particular product. These pyramid sales, however, are often just as
fraudulent as the traditional pyramid investment scam.
Although pyramid scams may be prosecuted under state civil
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and criminal statutes, case law reveals a conflict in how they are
defined and, therefore, which law applies.
THE CONSUMER FRAUD ACT

The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act prohibits fraud in the
sale or advertisement of merchandise. Merchandise is defined by
the statute as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or
anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale."'"
The question becomes whether a pyramid investment is a sale of
merchandise.
When the Consumer Fraud Act was first adopted in 1960, the
term merchandise was defined as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, or services. "14 In 1967, a bill was introduced amending
the definition to include "real estate, securities,services or anything
offered directly or indirectly to the public."15 Prior to passage of
the bill, however, the words "real estate" and "securities" were deleted.' 6 The appellate division has held that the Legislature intentionally deleted those words to eliminate these two areas of
commercial activity from the purview of the statute.1 7 Thus, if pyramid sales are securities, then they are not merchandise and the
Consumer Fraud Act is inapplicable. In this regard, the NewJersey
Supreme Court has reasoned that separate state agencies should
not have the right to exercise concurrent jurisdiction and control
over an area because of the real possibility of conflicting determinations, rulings, and regulations affecting the identical subject
matter. 18
In Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary,Inc.,19 the Attorney General of

New Jersey brought suit under the Consumer Fraud Act against a
cosmetics company which organized its sales under a pyramid concept. For a $5,000 investment, an investor would become a distributor of Koscot's cosmetics. This entitled the distributor to a 65%
discount on all future purchases of Koscot's cosmetics. For a
IS N.J.
14

STAT. ANN.

§ 56:8-1(c).

See Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 377, 358 A.2d 473, 479 (App. Div.

1976).

15 See id.

16 Id. Real estate, however, was added to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 in 1976. See id.
Thus, the law now covers fraud in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
merchandise or real estate.
17 Neveroski, 141 N.J. Super. at 378, 358 A.2d at 480.
18 Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 272, 390 A.2d 566, 569 (1978).
19 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (Ch. Div. 1972). See also Note, ConsumerFraud
- New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act Bars Pyramid Sales Schemes, 27 RUTGERs L. REv. 220
(1973) (providing a different analysis of Kugler v. Koscot).
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$2,000 investment, an investor would be designated a supervisor
and would be entitled to a 55% discount on all future purchases of
Koscot cosmetics. Distributors and supervisors could enlist beauty
advisors who would sell Koscot cosmetics at a 40% discount. Additionally, incentives were given to distributors to recruit supervisors,
as well as to supervisors to buy into the distributor slot and recruit
supervisors to replace their positions. The chancery division in Koscot noted that:
Koscot's distribution program is predicated upon a referral sales
and a pyramiding concept, a practice which is known as referral
or pyramid sales. It is an arrangement whereby one is induced
to buy upon representation that he cannot only regain his
purchase price but also earn profits by selling the same program
to the public. It thus involves the purchase of the right to sell
the same right to sell.2 °
Apparently unconcerned with the fact that cosmetics were actually sold along with distributorships, that court emphasized that a
major portion of Koscot's revenues was derived from the sale of
distributorships rather than from the sale of cosmetics. Moreover,
the court found that Koscot misrepresented the potential return
on an investment, among other things, in its literature and at its
emotionally charged "Golden Opportunity" meetings. Consequently, the court held that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
prohibited Koscot's sales practice. The chancery division, however,
never made a finding that pyramid sales are "merchandise." 21 Despite the failure to specifically address the issue of whether a pyramid is "merchandise," the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, has cited Kugler with approval.
The defendant in State of New Jersey v. FredericaBey argued for
reversal of her criminal conviction for promoting gambling by contending that the pyramid scheme she promoted was legal and the
participants understood the plan as legal. The court rejected her
argument as clearly incorrect, citing Kugler and noting that "pyramid sales schemes are prohibited by the Consumer Fraud Act."22
Moreover, the scheme employed in Bey was a pure pyramid and did
not involve the sale of any product. Neither court, however, made
any finding that pyramid investments are merchandise as defined
in the Consumer Fraud Act.
Kugler, 120 N.J. Super. at 232, 293 A.2d at 691.
Id. at 233, 293 A.2d at 691.
22 Bey, 261 N.J. Super. at 184, 618 A-2d at 374 (citing Kugler, 120 N.J. Super. at 23335, 293 A.2d at 691-92).
20
21
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Moreover, other courts have relied on Kugler. The law division, in Morgan v. Airbrook Limousine Inc.,23 held that the sale of a
franchise is "merchandise" within the meaning of the Consumer
Fraud Act, rejecting the plaintiffs claim that the Franchise Practices Act 24 would therefore subject franchise orders to two distinct
or conflicting regulatory schemes.2 ' Rather, the Morgan court, relying on Kugler, concluded that a franchise is subsumed within the
terms "commodities, services or anything offered directly or indirectly to the public for sale."2 6 Morgan also relied on an Illinois
case, People ex rel Scott v.. CardetInt'l, Inc.,2 7 which held that distribu-

torships were services and intangibles within the statutory definition of merchandise under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Thus,
the Illinois court concluded that the term "services" within section
1(c) of the Consumer Fraud Act includes the type of operational,
supervisory, and marketing assistance provided by a franchiser.
Morgan, however, also revealed the complexity of this issue by
recognizing that several other courts have held that sales of
franchises fall within the ambit of federal and state securities laws.
In fact, those securities law cases reveal the more well-reasoned approach to addressing the pyramid scheme.
THE UNIFORM SECURITIES LAW

New Jersey's Bureau of Securities considers pyramid scams a
violation of the Uniform Securities Law and may administratively
enjoin operators with a cease and desist order. 8 In so doing, the
Chief of the State Bureau of Securities makes findings: (1) that the
pyramid scheme is an investment contract and security as defined
in section 2(m) of the act;' (2) that participations in the scheme
are offered or sold while they are not registered or exempt, pursuant to section 13 of the act;"0 and (3) that such a sale is unlawful, in
23 211 N.J. Super. 84, 510 A.2d 1197 (Law Div. 1986).
24

N.J.

STAT. ANN. §

56:10-1.

The court came to this conclusion because the New Jersey Franchise Practices
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -29, does not provide for a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The Franchise Practices Act, however, does provide for rules and regulations on motor vehicle franchises. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-25.
26 Morgan, 211 NJ. Super. at 98, 510 A.2d at 1204.
App. Ct. 1974).
27 321 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ill.
28 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-67 which empowers the bureau chief to promulgate
orders which are reasonably necessary to carry out the law.
29 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(m) (defining security).
30 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-60 (proscribing sales of an unregistered security).
25
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violation of section 5 of the act 3 l because of the material misleading statements made by the offerors.3 2
Section 2(m) of the Uniform Securities Law defines security as
"any note; stock, treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; .. . [or any] investment contract."3 3 Section 1 of the act
provides that this statute shall be "construed as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which
enact similar laws and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this law with related federal regulations." 34 As such, the
New Jersey judiciary often looks to federal decisions under the Securities Act of 193331 for guidance in interpreting cases under New
Jersey's Uniform Securities Law.3 6
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Howey, 7 the United
States Supreme Court held that an "investment contract" for purposes of the Securities Act means "a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."3" In support of its interpretation of the
term investment contract, the Court, in footnote 4, cites Stevens v.
Liberty Packing Corp.39 to show the broad definition of the term
found in state decisions.
In that case, Liberty offered an absentee ownership agreement, called a lease, whereby an investor could purchase four female rabbits. The does were leased back to Liberty for breeding.
Liberty would thereafter divide the offspring between it and the
investor. The investor also had the promise that Liberty would buy
each of the offspring for one dollar a piece. The second part of
the scheme entails a buy-back contract where Liberty would sell
four does and a buck and the investor would raise them in his back
yard. Liberty agreed, however, to buy the offspring at one dollar a
piece.
Liberty published pamphlets assuring the investor that he was
31 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-52(b) (proscribing fraud in connection with the sale of a
security).
32 See e.g. In the Matter of Vernon Camhi and Morris Padulo, Jr. and In the Matter
of Salvatore A. Graci and Stephen J. Delpome.
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(m) (emphasis added).
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-48.
35 15 U.S.C. § 77b.
36 See AMR Realty Co. v. State, 149 N.J. Super. 329, 373 A.2d 1002 (App. Div.
1977).
37 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
38 Id. at 298-99.
39 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (1932).

1642

SETON HALL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 26:1635

guaranteed against loss, calculating the significant income which
could be made from the investment. Liberty, however, reserved
the right to arbitrarily condemn the herd of offspring and put an
end to its obligation. The court concluded, in a description strikingly similar to the Network, that "the scheme is pure swindle, in
which the money of new purchasers is used to placate earlier victims, only to collapse when there are no more to plunder."4 The
court found "[t] he home treatment lease and the 'buy-back' contract ... securities within meeting of our securities act."4 1 Moreover, the court noted, as is common in pyramid schemes, that some
of the investors refused to complain. In this regard, the court said:
[o]rdinarily, a fraud so gross as this one would be enjoined almost as a matter of routine, but, as unconvinced victims protest
against our intention and, as we are informed, other unscrupulous operators promoting the same scheme are invading our
state to trick the unweary, we feel it our duty to expose the
cheat, to caution the unsuspecting and to warn the swindlers.42
Additionally, the court stated:
The objects [of the Securities Act], then, are to prevent fraud
and unfair dealing in securities, as well as to prevent honest people, free from sinister influences, from investing in uncertain,
ephemeral, "get rich quick" stocks and securities. In other
words, it is a statute designed, in part, to protect credulous persons against their own inherent weakness-a weakness akin to
the gamblers hope of winning a prize. We think it is well settled
that both of these objects, within constitutional bounds, properly come43within regulations prescribed by the police powers of
the State.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Glenn Turner, Inc.,' the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase "with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others," enunciated in Howey, to mean "whether
the efforts made by those other than an investor are the undeniably significant ones, the essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise. " 5 In so doing, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on language in
Howey that explained that the definition of a security embodies a
"flexible rather than a static principal, one that is capable of adap40

Id. at 65, 161 A. at 195.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 62-65, 161 A. at 193-95.
Id. at 66, 161 A. at 195.
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 482.

43

44
45
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tation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits."'46
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Securities Exchange Commission v. Koscot InterplanetaryInc.4 7 adopted
the test from Turner. This federal case, brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission against Koscot, was premised upon the
same cosmetics distribution scheme as outlined in the New Jersey
chancery division opinion in Kugler. In the federal case, however,
the Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Koscot had
committed fraud in connection with the sale of a security.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the government's
case, the Fifth Circuit held that Koscot's scheme satisfied all three
elements of the Howey test. In rendering its decision, the Court of
Appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Howey, relied on Stevens to illustrate the broad reach of the Uniform Securities Law. The same conclusion was reached by the Michigan Court
of Appeals in People v. Cooper" upholding the defendant's criminal
conviction under the Uniform Securities Law.4 9
THE CONFI.CT
In Stella v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,5" the New Jersey appellate
division held that fraud in the sale of shares of stock or other securities is not within the scope of the NewJersey Consumer Fraud Act.
That case involved fraud by a broker at Dean Witter who was ultimately sued by a defrauded investor. On appeal, the court considered, among other things, whether the investor was entitled to
treble damages under the Consumer Fraud Act. The court resolved that issue in the negative, thereby undermining the most
punitive remedy available in a civil case. Thus, there is a conflict in
how these schemes may be redressed. If the Michigan Court of
Appeals and New Jersey Bureau of Securities are correct, and pyramid sales are securities under Howey, then the NewJersey Appellate
Division ruling in Stella-that the Consumer Fraud Act may not be
46 Id. at 481 (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 299).
47 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
48 421 N.W.2d 177 (1987).
49 Indeed, contrary to the decision reached by the Michigan Court of Appeals,
decisions in other jurisdictions have reached other conclusions. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d 105 (1971). The Hawaii decision has been criticized by the
Ninth Circuit as a strict interpretation rather than the flexible one suggested by the
United States Supreme Court. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
50 241 NJ. Super. 55, 574 A.2d 468 (App. Div. 1990).
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used to redress securities violations-makes erroneous the Kugler
holding that the Consumer Fraud Act outlaws pyramids. Indeed,
that the appellate division decision in Bey cited Kugler with approval
makes the conflict more acute. This issue is therefore ripe forjudicial or legislative resolution.
The principal weakness in relying on the court's conclusion in
Bey--that pyramid sales schemes are prohibited by the Consumer
Fraud Act-is that its finding is merely dicta. The appellate division was construing the criminal code in Bey, not the Consumer
Fraud Act. Additionally, the defendant in Bey offered nothing to
her investors in the way of "objects, wares, goods, commodities or
services." Moreover, although Kugler could have explicitly held
that the sale of cosmetics by Koscot was a sale of merchandise giving the Attorney General jurisdiction under the Consumer Fraud
Act, it did not. The chancery division appeared to focus solely on
the sale of Koscot "distributorships."
Indeed, it does appear that the investor in a fraudulent pyramid scheme must rely on the efforts of his successors to solicit new
investors to keep the cycle going. The chairperson, who receives
the investment, leaves the group. Therefore, the securities law
analysis focusing on the three-prong Howey test of investment of
money, in a common enterprise, with profits to come solely from
significant essentially managerial efforts made by those other than
an investor, appears to more accurately describe a pyramid investment. The investor must rely on those coming after him to recruit
additional investors; he is not relying on the "services" of the
chairperson.
Civil prosecution under either theory, however, may be made
in the alternative. For example, if the Attorney General moves
under the Consumer Fraud Act and the defendant interposes a defense that the pyramid sale is a security rather than merchandise,
the Attorney General may amend his civil complaint to now allege
a violation of the securities law. This strategy, however, is unavailable in a criminal prosecution because there is no criminal violation
of the Consumer Fraud Act.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

In State v. Deluzio, the New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed
the appellate division's opinion in Bey that pyramid organizers are
potentially subject to the criminal theft by deception penalties. A
prosecution under theft by deception, however, often causes proof
problems. The defendant invariably will argue, as did the defend-
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ant in Bey, that the investment was legal and that all the participants understood the plan, implying that the participants
understood the risks attendant to investing in this scheme. Bey definitively rejected the first argument, but in so doing relied on
Kugler.
The second argument, however, is more compelling; an investor may understand the risks associated with buying into a pyramid.
Indeed, one could make the mathematical calculations to determine how many people are required to work through the completion of the pyramid. Thus, a jury may conclude that no deception
has occurred despite the organizer's failure to reveal all information which affects an investor's judgment. The jury's verdict, in
favoring of Bey on the theft by deception charge suggests that is
precisely what the jury concluded in that case.
Moreover, DeLuzio confirmed the Bey holding that a pyramid
scheme was not an illegal lottery or policy or numbers game under
the gambling statute 51 reasoning that
when the indictment here is read against the statutory
definition of a lottery and the proofs in this case, it appears
that the defendant was not engaged in gambling by means of a
lottery (or a policy or numbers game). Because the facts
proven at trial could not satisfy the statutory definition of a
lottery, defendant's conviction for materially aiding such "lot52
tery" cannot stand.
This holding, along with Kugler and Stella, reveal the inadequacy of
current law to deal with this type of swindle.
Although it appears from the case law in other jurisdictions
that pyramid sales are securities, that question is unresolved under
the New Jersey decisions in Kugler, Stella and Bey. This unresolved
question of whether pyramid sales are merchandise or securities
casts a cloud over criminal prosecution under New Jersey's Uniform Securities Law. Section 23 (a) 5" provides that any person who
willfully violates any provision of the Uniform Securities Law is
guilty of a crime of the third degree. Based on the findings of the
Chief of the Bureau of Securities and under Howey and its progeny,
pyramid sales are securities and investment contracts; promoters of
these scams would, therefore, be subject to criminal prosecution
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-1 (h).
52 Bey, 261 N.J. Super at 189, 618 A.2d at 377, approved in State v. DiLuzio, 136 N.J.
51

363 (1994).
53 N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 49:3-70(a).
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under the act. Thus, a willful violation of section 5 (a),"4 proscribing material misleading statements in connection with the sale of
securities, is a third degree crime. Indeed, the application of this
law addresses the concern raised in Liberty by protecting people
against their own weaknesses.
Koscot and Bey, however, may provide a plausible, although
weak, defense: pyramid sales are not securities, but rather merchandise under the Consumer Fraud Act. Until a court resolves
this issue, criminal prosecution under the Uniform Securities Law
is dubious. Moreover, unlike civil remedies, there is no alternative
for criminal prosecution under the Consumer Fraud Act.
In 1993, a NewJersey county grand jury indicted four individuals in State of New Jersey v. NickeP5 for, among other things, fraud in
connection with the sale of a security and sale of an unregistered
security. This indictment is predicated on the pyramid investment
scam known as the Network. Although that case provides the ideal
vehicle to test whether pyramid investments are merchandise or
securities, this issue has not been addressed by an appellate court.
In the absence ofjudicial resolution of this case of first impression, the Legislature's consideration of Senate Bill No. 166, "An
act prohibiting promotional schemes and supplementing Chapter
20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes," 56 appeared to be a partial resolution to the apparent gap in prosecuting pyramid
schemes. That bill, if enacted into law, would have criminalized
operating or promoting a pyramid promotional scheme. The bill
defined a pyramid promotional scheme as:
any plan or operation by which a participant gives consideration
for the opportunity to receive compensation which is derived
primarily from any person's introduction of other persons into
participation in the plan or operation rather than from the sale
of goods services or intangible property.5 7
Although the bill would have prohibited the promotion of a
scheme that "involves the purchase of the right to sell the same
right to sell,"5 8 enacting this proposed legislation would leave unresolved the apparent conflict in the civil remedies until judicial
resolution of the merchandise verses securities question.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-52(b).
55 Indictment No. 93-5-789.
54
56

See Appendix A.

57

See Appendix A.

58
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CONCLUSION

Since 1932 and the decision in Liberty, people have been willing to invest money in scams mathematically certain to collapse.
Since that time, the United States Supreme Court, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, and courts in other jurisdictions have, in the
words of Liberty, made decisions affecting the state's attempt to protect credulous people from their own weakness, something akin to
a gambler's hope. Ironically, however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has held that this scam does not fall within NewJersey's gambling statute and the application of other laws is uncertain not because, as the New Jersey Supreme Court feared, separate state
agencies have issued conflicting rulings, but because the judiciary
has rendered conflicting opinions. Two opportunities to drain this
quagmire have now presented themselves, but the question remains whether promoters will successfully continue to sell the same
right to sell.
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APPENDIX A
SENATE, No. 166
STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Introduced Pending Technical Review by Legislative Counsel
PRE-FILED FOR INTRODUCTION IN THE 1994 SESSION
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By Senator PALAIA
AN ACT prohibiting pyramid promotional schemes and
supplementing Chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey
Statutes.
BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the
State of New Jersey:
1. a. As used in this section:
(1) "Participant" means a person who contributes money into a
pyramid promotional scheme but does not promote, organize or
operate the scheme;
(2) "Promoting a pyramid promotional scheme" means inducing
or attempting to induce one or more other persons to become
participants, or assisting another person in promoting a pyramid
promotional scheme by any means including the provision of
references.
(3) "Pyramid promotional scheme" means any plan or
operation by which a participant gives consideration for the
opportunity to receive compensation which is derived primarily
from any person's introduction of other persons into participation
in the plan or operation rather than from the sale of goods,
services or intangible property by the participants or other
persons introduced into the plan or operation.
(4) "Compensation" means payment of any money, thing of
value, or financial benefit. Compensation does not include
payment based on sales of products by the person or by other
participants in the plan to anyone, including a participant in the
plan, who is purchasing the products for actual use or
consumption.
(5) "Consideration" means the payment of cash or the purchase
of products but does not include the purchase of products
furnished at cost to be used in making sales and not for resale,
the purchase of products where the seller offers to repurchase
the products acquired by the participant from the seller at
reasonable commercial terms nor does it include time and effort
spent in pursuit of sales or recruiting activities.
(6) "Products" means goods, services, or intangible property of
any kind.
(7) "Reasonable commercial terms" includes repurchase of all
unencumbered products which are in an unused, commercially
resalable condition within one year from the participant's date of
purchase; such repurchase shall be at a price not less than 90
percent of the original net cost to the participant of the products
being returned. For purposes of this paragraph, "original net
cost" means the amount actually paid by the participant for the
products, less any consideration received by the participant for
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purchase of the products being returned. Products which are no
longer marketed by a program shall be deemed "resalable" if the
products are otherwise in an unused, commercially resalable
condition and are returned to the seller within one year from the
participant's date of purchase; provided, however, that products
which are no longer marketed by a program shall not be deemed
"resalable" if the products are sold to participants as
nonreturnable discontinued, seasonal, or special promotion items
and the nonreturnable nature of the products was clearly
disclosed to the participant prior to purchase.
b. A person commits a crime if he contrives, prepares,
establishes, operates, advertises, sells, promotes or participates
in a pyramid promotional scheme.
c. (1) Any person who violates subsection b. of this section by
contriving, preparing, establishing, operating, advertising or
promoting a pyramid promotional scheme is guilty of a crime of
the third degree.
(2) Any person who violates subsection b. of this section by
participating in a pyramid promotional scheme is guilty of a
crime of the fourth degree except that if the amount of
consideration which the person contributed to a pyramid
promotional scheme was $100.00 or less, the person is guilty of a
disorderly persons offense.
d. (1) It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a crime under
this section that the scheme or plan involved both a franchise to
sell a particular product and the authority to sell additional
franchises if the emphasis of the scheme is on the sale of
additional franchises.
(2) It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a crime under
paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section that the person,
after signing an agreement to participates, later withdraws from
the pyramid promotional scheme.
2. This act shall take effect immediately.
STATEMENT
This bill would provide criminal penalties for operating and
participating in pyramid promotional schemes. This bill defines
"pyramid promotional scheme" to mean any plan or operation by
which a participant gives consideration for the opportunity to
receive compensation which is derived primarily from the
introduction of other persons into the plan or operation which
than from the sale of goods, services or intangible property by
the participants.
With regard to penalties, the bill provides that a person who
establishes, operates or promotes a pyramid promotional scheme
would be guilty of crime of the third degree. A person who
participates in a pyramid promotional scheme would be guilty of
a crime of the fourth degree, except that if the amount that the
person contributed to the scheme was $100.00 or less, the person
is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.

1650

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1635

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
STATEMENT TO
SENATE, No. 166
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Dated May 5, 1994
The Senate Judiciary Committee reports favorably Senate Bill
No. 166
This bill would provide criminal penalties for operating and
participating in pyramid promotional schemes. The bill defines
"pyramid promotional scheme" to mean any plan or operation by
which a participant gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation which is derived primarily from the introduction of other persons into the plan or operation rather than from
the sale of goods, services or intangible property by the
participants.
With regard to penalties, the bill provides that a person who
establishes, operates or promotes a pyramid promotional scheme
would be guilty of a crime of the third degree. A person who participates in a pyramid promotional scheme would be guilty of a
crime of the fourth degree, except that if the amount that the person contributed to the scheme was $100.00 or less, the person is
guilty of a disorderly persons offense.
This bill was prefiled for introduction in the 1994 session
pending technical review. As reported, the bill includes the
changes required by technical review which has been performed
1

2
3
4

Establishes criminal penalties for operation or participating in
pyramid promotional schemes.
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THE NETWORK
CHAIRPERSON

PRESIDENT

EXEC. VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

"

VICE PRES.

PRESIDENT

EXEC. VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

YOU MUST PAY TO PLAY

EXEC. VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

EXEC. VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

VICE PRES.

* YOU MUST ATTEND THE

MEETINGS OR BE
REPRESENTED.
" YOU MUST BRING AT LEAST
ONE PERSON INTO THE
NETWORK

* ABSOLUTELY NO PIGGY-

BACKING
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Entry
Level

Number
of Charts

Additional Persons
Needed For All
Participants to Advance
to Next Level

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

1
2
4
8
16
32
64
128
246
512
1024
2048
4096
8192
16384
32768
65536
131072
262144
524288
1048576
2097152
4194304
8388608
16777216
33554432

8
16
32
64
128
256
512
1024
2048
4096
8192
16384
32768
65536
131072
262144
524288
1048576
2097152
4194304
8388608
16777216
33554432
67108864
134217728
268435456

Total
Participants
to Date
15
31
63
127
255
511
1023
2047
4095
8191
16383
32767
65535
131071
262143
524287
1048575
2097151
4194303
8388607
16777215
33554431
67108863
134217727
268435455
536870911

Return of
Profit f
Entered
at Level

The above chart is based upon the most common type of pyramid, a four level
pyramid.
Lev(
Level 2
Level 2
Level 3 Level 3 Level 3 Level 3
Level 4 Level 4 Level 4 Level 4 Level 4 Level 4 Level 4 Level 4

